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Abstract. Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of
“genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions.
We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization,
its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result
from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role
in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our
fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result from it are adaptive responses to
local conditions, not past evolutionary environments. If different individuals share common environments, however, they may develop similar “modules,” and this process can mimic the development
of genetically specified modules in the evolutionary psychologist’s sense.
Key words: adaptation, brain development, domain specificity, evolutionary psychology, modularity,
plasticity

Evolutionary psychologists1 claim that the human mind is a network of distinct, yet
interacting, psychological adaptations. Summarizing this view, Pinker says, “the
mind is organized into modules or mental organs, each with a specialized design
that makes it an expert in one arena of interaction with the world. The modules’
basic logic is specified by our genetic program. Their operation was shaped by
1 The term “evolutionary psychology” is ambiguous in common usage. It sometimes refers to a
field of inquiry encompassing a range of work so broad that it is united only by a desire to understand
the evolution of the human mind. More frequently, however, the term is used in a more specific
sense, designating only work conducted within a particular set of theoretical and methodological
commitments shared by a prominent and highly influential group of researchers (most notably, David
M. Buss, Leda Cosmides, Martin Daly, Steven Pinker, Donald Symons, John Tooby, and Margo
Wilson). In this narrower sense, “evolutionary psychology” designates a Kuhnian paradigm – a
shared and unquestioned framework of theory, methodology, and exemplars (specific explanations
that serve as models for further scientific research). Our focus in what follows is this paradigm, which
has become very prominent and has received the most attention of all the work on the evolution of
human psychology.
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natural selection to solve the problems of the hunting and gathering life led by our
ancestors in most of our evolutionary history” (Pinker, 1997, p. 21).
We do not doubt that an adult human brain is at least partially modularized.
However, in what follows, we contend that the brain is not modularized in the
ways that evolutionary psychologists claim; we do not have lots of “genetically
specified,” domain-specific, informationally encapsulated, cognitive processing
streams. To see why this is true, one must understand a bit about brain plasticity
and development. But first a summary of evolutionary psychology’s modular view
of the mind.

1. The Modularity of the Adapted Mind
It was once widely accepted that the mind comes equipped with just a few general
cognitive procedures, which are employed in learning everything we come to
know about the world. These few procedures were considered domain general,
in that they were assumed to be applicable to any problem domain that might be
encountered – everything from the acquisition of language or mathematical skill to
the ability to play chess or ride a bicycle. In this view, the mind doesn’t bring any
specific knowledge of a particular problem domain to the process of learning in that
domain. Rather, all the information the mind possesses about a particular problem
domain is extracted from the world by its few domain-general procedures.
Evolutionary psychologists reject this in favor of a view of the mind as
consisting of numerous modules, which are characterized by a few special
properties (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987, 1994; Pinker, 1997; Tooby and Cosmides,
1992; Symons, 1987). First, a module is domain specific – that is, it is specialized
to deal only with a restricted problem domain. As such, its information-processing
procedures are activated only by information about a particular aspect of the world,
and it is unresponsive to information about other aspects of the world, in much the
way the ear is responsive only to specific vibratory frequencies (Cosmides and
Tooby, 1987; Pinker, 1997).
Further, according to evolutionary psychologists, a module develops in the
absence of any explicit instruction in the problem domain with which it is
specialized to deal (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994; Pinker, 1997; Tooby and Cosmides
1992). Their view is not, however, that a module develops in the absence of any
environmental input; for they claim that some kind of triggering stimulus is typically required during a critical period of development in order to bring a module
on line (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). Their view, rather, is that the environmental
inputs that trigger development of a module always contain far less information
than is present in the fully developed mechanism. This is because a module comes
equipped with certain “innate knowledge” about the problem domain with which it
is specialized to deal and an “innate” set of procedures for applying that knowledge
to solve problems in its special domain. That is, rather than needing to extract all
its information about its problem domain from the world during the course of an
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individual’s life, a module contains “unlearned” information and procedures about
its problem domain, which it employs in its problem solving (Cosmides and Tooby,
1987, 1994; Pinker, 1997; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992).
Finally, though infrequently acknowledged by evolutionary psychologists, their
account of the properties and behavior of modules requires that each module is,
to some degree, informationally encapsulated. That is, a module doesn’t have
access to the full range of information available in an organism’s brain, even when
some of that information is relevant to solving problems in its specialized problem
domain (Cosmides, 1989; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). Rather, a module tends
to have access only to the outputs of other psychological mechanisms and not to
the information employed by those mechanisms in generating their outputs. This,
to some extent, is simply domain specificity functioning internally: Not only are
modules activated by and responsive to restricted ranges of information in the
environment, “screening out” all other environmental information, but they access
only restricted ranges of information in the brain as well, screening out all other
mental information.
Evolutionary psychologists have tended to ignore this property of modules, or
even to downplay its significance. As Pinker says: “Modules are defined by the
special things they do with the information available to them, not necessarily by the
kinds of information they have available” (1997, p. 31). But their account requires
some degree of modular informational encapsulation, for at least two reasons.
First, only some degree of informational encapsulation accounts for the specific
kinds of cognitive “misfiring” that are prevalent in evolutionary psychologists’
explanations of aspects of human behavior. For example, although evolutionary
psychologists claim that human males have evolved modules regulating sexual
behavior so as to promote reproductive success, those modules fail to cause men to
donate to sperm banks in large numbers, even when men know that doing so would
promote their reproductive success. The reason offered is that those modules are
unresponsive to information acquired through cognitive channels other than those
narrowly involved in their own functioning (Buss, 1995). Similarly, in Cosmides’
(1989) work on social cognition, she hypothesizes that the module subserving
reasoning about cheater detection systematically causes logically fallacious inferences under certain circumstances, even when subjects have received training in
formal logic. Again, the reason is that the cheater-detection module is unresponsive
to knowledge of logic, which is acquired through cognitive channels external to
the cheater-detection module’s functioning. If the modules postulated by evolutionary psychologists weren’t informationally encapsulated to some degree, then
these sorts of cognitive misfiring wouldn’t occur. For an unencapsulated “module”
would simply incorporate the information available through the other channels and
condition its outputs on that information.
Second, if putative modules had access not only to one another’s outputs, but
to the information processed in generating those outputs as well, then the mind
wouldn’t be truly modular. For a mind composed of “separate mechanisms” that

310

DAVID J. BULLER AND VALERIE GRAY HARDCASTLE

made use of the information available to all the other mechanisms would just be
a general-purpose mind. To put this another way, domain specificity and “innate”
knowledge in themselves don’t necessitate modularity – that is, they don’t require
separate, functionally specialized psychological mechanisms (see Samuels, 1998
and Fodor, 2000). For a non-modular mind equipped with just a few generalpurpose cognitive procedures, which were applied in all learning and problem
solving, could still perform domain-specific cognitive processing: If it were solving
problems about cows, it would draw on and process specialized knowledge about
cows, rather than information about desktops (unless, of course, it was figuring out
how to get the cows off the desktops). And such a general-purpose mind could still
possess “innate” knowledge about special problem domains. So domain-specific
processing and “innate” knowledge are compatible with a non-modular, generalpurpose mind. Modules only emerge when domain-specific processing and bodies
of “innate” knowledge are contained within informationally encapsulated mechanisms; for only then are the mechanisms truly separate and functionally specialized
(Fodor, 2000).
Evolutionary psychologists frequently support their modular view of the mind
with the following argument. They point out that the adaptive problems faced by
our Pleistocene ancestors were very diverse in character, ranging from identifying
edible plant matter and avoiding deadly predators to selecting a reproductively
valuable mate and cooperating with others in a status hierarchy. They then hypothesize that, given the diverse characters of these problems, what constitutes a
successful solution to one problem is very different from what constitutes a solution to another. They then infer that no domain-general problem-solving strategy
could have successfully solved the full range of adaptive problems faced by our
Pleistocene ancestors, but that each adaptive problem would have required its
own domain-specific problem-solving strategy. As Symons says: “It is no more
probable that some sort of general-purpose brain/mind mechanism could solve
all the behavioral problems an organism faces (find food, choose a mate, select
a habitat, etc.) than it is that some sort of general-purpose organ could perform all
physiological functions (pump blood, digest food, nourish an embryo, etc.)” (1992,
p. 142). Thus, evolutionary psychologists conclude, humans could not have evolved
minds consisting of a single all-purpose problem-solving mechanism; rather, they
must have evolved distinct domain-specific mechanisms, each executing a program
devoted to solving a specific adaptive problem.
Thus inspired, evolutionary psychologists postulate modules for incest
avoidance, sexual attraction, mate choice, jealousy, mate retention, allocation of
parental resources, kin relations, alliance formation, aggressive threat, danger
avoidance, food preferences, habitat choice, and so on for all manner of complex
cognitive and behavioral functions (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p. 110). Indeed,
Tooby and Cosmides claim that “our cognitive architecture resembles a confederation of hundreds or thousands” of modules (1995, p. xiii; emphasis added). They
contend that “the brain must be composed of a large collection of circuits, with
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different circuits specialized for solving different problems. One can think of each
specialized circuit as a minicomputer that is dedicated to solving one problem”
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1997, p. 81). “Over evolutionary time, the brain’s circuits
were cumulatively added because they reasoned or processed information in a way
that enhanced the adaptive regulation of behavior” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997,
p. 78). Consequently, they conclude, “what is special about the human mind is
not that it gave up ‘instinct’ in order to become flexible, but that it proliferated
‘instincts’ – that is, content-specific problem-solving specializations” (Tooby and
Cosmides, 1992, p. 113).
Since each of these many modules is purportedly designed by selection to
solve its own adaptive problem, evolutionary psychologists are committed to the
claim that each module evolved independently of the others (though many may
have evolved during the same time period). Further, evolutionary psychologists
claim that modules are “complex adaptations,” which require “hundreds or thousands of genes to regulate their development” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p. 78).
Consequently, the evolution and adaptive shaping of each encapsulated module
would have required numerous mutations over evolutionary time, each of which
added or modified a functionally specialized “brain circuit,” and all of which
were preserved by selection as the gene complex that builds that module during
development – or, in Pinker’s words, as that part of the “genetic program” that
“specifies” the “basic design” of that “mental organ” (1997, pp. 21 and 32).

2. Informational Encapsulation and Domain Specificity
Brain plasticity belies the idea of encapsulated modularity, for our informationprocessing streams are not really separate streams at all. There is much informational overlap between what are normally thought of as distinct processing areas.
In other words, whatever modules one might want to identify in the brain are not as
distinct, or informationally encapsulated, as evolutionary psychologists typically
imply.
Charting the variety of brain plasticity has become a cottage industry in neuroscience. Despite the popular press’s pronouncements that brains don’t or can’t
change much after our first few years – and that the changes in the first few years
are absolutely crucial (hence the need for black and white mobiles for infants and
the White House’s tremendous interest in early childhood education) – our brains
are changing all the time, and changing quite rapidly and profoundly. We now know
that the number of neurons in prefrontal, inferior temporal, and posterior parietal
cortex increases throughout life (Gould et al., 1999). In addition, not only do our
brains continue to grow (at least in some places), but they are continually reorganizing themselves in response to environmental demands. If we lose a finger, the
brain region that used to respond to its input in somatosensory cortex will decrease
in size and the neighboring regions will expand until nothing is left of the functional
brain area at all (Merzenich et al., 1983). The converse holds true as well. If we
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overstimulate a digit for a while, its corresponding area in cortex increases in size.
It is important to note that these changes occur outside of any “critical” period for
learning and can occur within a matter of hours or days. Indeed, it appears that our
brains change enough over our lifetimes such that, by the time we are old, we use
regions in our brains that are different from the ones we used as young adults to
accomplish the same tasks (MacIntosh et al., 1999).
How can our brains maintain a plasticity that allows for changes of function
within hours? It now looks as though areas or regions once thought to be dedicated
to one processing task are actually receiving inputs from more than one processing
stream. When the median nerve of the hand is severed in adult owl or squirrel
monkeys, areas 3b and 1 in somatosensory cortex (areas that normally respond
to medial nerve stimulation) begin almost immediately to respond to inputs from
other nerves in the hand (Merzenich et al., 1983; see also Clark et al., 1988). Our
best explanation of the rapidity of the response is that silencing the medial nerve
inputs “unmasks” secondary inputs from other afferent nerves.
fMRI studies of human somatosensory cortex, human behavioral studies of
phantom limb patients, and animal studies all indicate that the brain maintains overlapping dynamic representations (Doetsch et al., 1983; Dostrovsky et al., 1976;
Merrill and Wall, 1978; Metzler and Marks, 1979; Ramachandran, 1994; Sanes et
al., 1995; Wall and Egger, 1971). In each case, we see areas of cortex allegedly
dedicated to processing one sort of information process very different sorts of
information as well. And these areas change as the environmental stimuli change.
We are misled by our own localizationist methodologies to a certain extent; we
expected the one area-one function rule to apply in the brain before we ever started
recording neural activity. However, what we expected to find and what we are in
fact finding are two entirely different things.
Perhaps the most striking research that supports this blurring of processing
streams concerns how our brains compensate for vestibular disturbances. If we
ablate the semicircular canals in our ear so that our vestibular system no longer
receives any orientation information, we recover at least our static vestibular
responses very quickly, much faster than we could grow new synaptic connections.
Single-cell recordings show that vestibular processing is not rerouted elsewhere in
the brain; the same neurons in the brain stem that respond to normal vestibular
inputs are also used in recovery. Obviously, they must be getting orientation information from somewhere other than the (now ablated) semicircular canals. Some
other sensory system must already be feeding into the vestibular system. One
hypothesis is that brains use a form of sensory substitution to compensate for the
vestibular-ocular reflex (Berthoz, 1988; Miles and Lisberger, 1981). In this case,
the brain would use internally generated signals from the visual or somatosensory
systems to compensate for the vestibular loss. It would substitute computations
from the saccadic or a visual pursuit system (both of which probably reconstruct
head velocity internally) for vestibular throughputs. Perhaps as animals try to orient
toward targets, error signals from the retina help the vestibular system compute
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head location. Currently ongoing work is directed toward exploring this possibility
(Stewart, personal communication).
Of course, it is not the case that everything is connected to everything else.
It might be that our vestibular system is only connected to retinal error detection
signals and nothing else. In that sense, we might maintain that various processing
streams are isolated from other processes. But, if our alleged topographical
maps in somatosensory cortex contain secondary connections for other inputs, if
brain representations and processing fundamentally overlap one another, if even
“modality-specific” processing receives inputs from other modalities, there is little
sense in which we can maintain that even our most basic processes are distinct in
the way that evolutionary psychology’s modularity hypothesis implies. And, if this
is the case for our most basic cognitive processes, it likely holds as well for the
“higher” cognitive processes involved in adaptive problem solving of the sort that
interests evolutionary psychologists.
Research in neural plasticity also dovetails with recent data that highlight crossmodal connections. For example, if you touch someone’s body on the same side
and at the same time as you present a visual stimulus to her, activation in the
lingual gyrus is significantly more than when the visual stimulus is presented
alone. Imaging studies of this phenomenon indicate that the somatosensory areas
of cortex project back to the visual areas, thus telling the visual cortex about tactile
stimuli received (Macaluso et al., 2000). The extent of crossmodal communication
between and among our alleged sensory “modules” is still a matter of investigation,
though we do know that our auditory and visual areas exchange lots of information regarding speech perception and that there are considerable crossmodal
connections between thalamic nuclei and cortex.
This degree of informational overlap also shows that our brain systems are not
domain specific; rather, they are domain dominant. One sort of processing in a brain
region may be more prominent than others, but other processing is still occurring.
Our “modules” are not so specialized that they deal only with restricted domains.
Instead, they deal mostly with particular domains, and do so only contingently; the
dedication of a brain system to a particular task domain is subject to change as the
inputs to that brain system change. Despite evolutionary psychologists’ claims to
the contrary, the need for specialized problem solving does not prevent our various
brain areas from talking to one another.

3. From Genes to Thought
Now consider the following facts about brain development. From the time the
human brain begins to develop in utero, at about 25 days gestation, it increases
by a remarkable 250,000 cells per minute (Thompson, 1993). No doubt much of
this development is “hardwired” to some degree, for all the major areas of the brain
are essentially the same across mammals. However, how we go from our genetic
endowment to a fully developed human brain is a complicated story of feedback
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loops piggybacking on environmental contingencies, not a story of a developmental
process unfolding in accordance with a “genetic program.”
The total number of genes in human DNA is currently estimated at around
80,000 (Gerhart and Kirschner, 1997, p. 121). As much as 50% of these may
be concerned with our brain (Thompson, 1993), yet we have literally trillions of
synaptic connections in our head. There is no way even 40,000 genes could code
for that exactly. Only in very simple creatures, such as the nematode C. elegans
(who has 302 neurons with about 7,000 neuronal connections), might we even
hope to find relatively direct genetic control of nervous system development. (But
we may not even find genetic control of development in them; for work on mapping
the genome of C. elegans led even the early proponents of the notion of a “genetic
program” controlling development to abandon it as a hopelessly inadequate model
of development (de Chadarevian, 1998).)
This picture is even more bleak for those who wish to find genetic programs
for our higher cognitive functions, which are located primarily in cortex, for it
appears that most of the genetic “specification” for our brain concerns the more
peripheral structures. Our genes do not seem to worry much about how to create
most of our brain and are instead dedicated to making sure our sensory transducers
are constructed properly. Fully 4% of the genes concerned with brain development
(roughly 1,600) are concerned with building the sensory cells located inside our
nose (Winberg and Porter, 1998).2
Moreover, if our genes programmed for the development of the cortical structures involved in higher cognition, we would expect some positive correlation
between genome size and the degree of complexity of higher cognitive functions.
But the comparative data instead reveal a “relative constancy of genome size
across vast differences in brain size and correspondingly astronomical differences
in connections” (Deacon, 1997, p. 197). Indeed, despite our vastly more complex
brains, humans have roughly the same number of genes as the house mouse, Mus
musculus (Gerhart and Kirschner, 1997, p. 121).
For much of the brain, the immediate cellular environment, and not our genes,
determines the formation of brain structure. Epithelial cells later destined to be
a brain first grow in a neural plate, which later folds into a neural tube. As the
cells stop dividing, they begin migrating toward their final destination. Exactly
how neurons know to stop dividing or how they know where to go in the cranium
is still a mystery, but scientists have uncovered at least three relevant factors. First,
there are chemical signals, neural trophic factors, that force certain neurons to grow
toward particular target cells. Second, some neurons, such as the Purkinje cells in
the cerebrum, send out exploratory fibers they later migrate up. Third, and most
important for our purposes, there is cell competition and cell death (Gierer and
Muller, 1995).
2 If genetic “specification” is an essential property of modules, then, Fodor’s (1983) minimalist

modularity hypothesis, which counts only the sensory input systems (and language input systems) as
modules, appears far closer to the truth than the evolutionary psychological modularity hypothesis.
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For a simple example of the latter, consider the development of motor neuron
axons (see, e.g., Thompson, 1993, pp. 307–308). Each motor neuron is connected
to at least one, though usually more than one, muscle fiber, yet each muscle
fiber is innervated by only one motor neuron. But we do not find this onemany connectivity pattern in the developing embryo. Instead, we find many
motor neurons connected to many muscle fibers. Over time, the ends of most
of the motor neurons retract until only one neuron controls each muscle fiber.
Our best hypothesis for the mechanism for this sort of neuronal pruning is that
motor neurons compete with one another for sole activation rights (Changeux and
Danchin, 1976). The neuron with the strongest activation wins, and the penalty for
losing this fight is death.
Two types of innervation are relevant in the competition for cellular survival.
Both spontaneous endogenous firing and the activity produced by sensory inputs
shape our final brain structures (Cramer and Sur, 1995; Innocenti, 1995; Katz
and Shatz, 1996; Penn and Shatz, 1999; Wong, 1999). Indeed, without both of
these sorts of activity, the relevant neural structures simply do not develop. If we
block spontaneous retinal ganglion signaling using a chemical intervention, then
the lateral geniculate nucleus does not develop its normal layered structure (Shatz,
1996). If we keep one eye closed as our visual system is being pruned so that
our brain receives little input from one retina, we will end up functionally blind
in that eye. Even though the retinal ganglia produce normal inputs, the areas in
cortex to which they feed will no longer respond to visual inputs appropriately
(Penn and Shatz, 1999). Other brain regions are similarly dependent on environmental or endogenous stimuli, with cortical regions being largely dependent on
innervation from other brain cells (Deacon, 1997). If we block auditory inputs,
infants will not learn how to process speech or understand language without some
sort of special intervention (using a signed language, for example, or artificially
stimulating central auditory cortex) (Sinninger et al., 1999).
What do these facts tell us about evolutionary psychology’s modularity
hypothesis? No one expects psychological modules to be cleanly drawn in the
brain, not even evolutionary psychologists. As Pinker says, modules probably look
“like roadkill, sprawling messily over the bulges and crevasses of the brain” (1997,
p. 30). Nor do evolutionary psychologists think that environmental inputs are not
relevant to the development of modules. Indeed, they frequently repeat the truism
that all traits, including psychological modules, are a product of causal interaction between genes and environment. However, evolutionary psychologists treat
environmental factors as “triggers” that activate the development of a module in
accordance with a “developmental program” that is coded in the genes (Tooby and
Cosmides, 1992, pp. 82–87). The picture is that genes encode the information for
constructing a module, but that they await a cue from the environment telling them
when to begin constructing the module (or, in the case of a conditional genetic
program, that they await a cue from the environment telling them which of a limited
number of “settings” to apply in constructing the module).
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But environmental inputs and endogenous innervations do not simply “trigger”
the formation of various processing modules. Instead, during development we find
a diffuse proliferation of connectivity, which later brain activity, guided by interaction with the environment, sculpts into its final form (cf., Penn and Shatz, 1999).
Brain functions in infants appear to be widely distributed across a variety of neural
areas, and as they mature these same functions become localized to particular
regions (Goldman-Rakic et al., 1983; Webster et al., 1995). In this process, neurons
compete with one another for the sort of processing structure they are going to be,
and brain activity determines which neurons win this competition, hence which
processing roles neurons end up playing. The processing roles of neurons are
not laid down in advance by a “genetic program.” Genes play a role, of course,
in synthesizing the proteins that construct the initial proliferation of neurons and
their connections. But gene expression is not involved in sculpting, and therefore it
cannot explain, the “final” form that brain structures take.
To make these points intuitive, consider the analogy of scarring. Scarring is
a paradigm process of gene-environment interaction: Scar tissue will not form
without both a trauma of environmental origin and the synthesis of specific proteins
(which is genetically coded). If we are interested in explaining merely the microlevel process by which cells form scar tissue, appeal to genes may play a heavy
role in the explanation, since the explanation will “background” information about
the specific type of environmental trauma that initiates the process. If, on the other
hand, we are interested in explaining the particular pattern of scars on a particular individual’s body (that is, explaining the number of scars, their location, and
their particular shapes), our explanation will be entirely in terms of the history of
environmental traumas to which that individual has been subjected. This is by no
means to deny that genes play a role in the formation of scar tissue. But that role
could never explain a particular pattern of scars.
Similarly, although genes clearly play a role in the formation of brain structures
(in particular, in the construction of neurons and their connections), the “shape”
of those brain structures is explained by the patterns of environmental and endogenous innervation of brain cells, not by any process “programmed” by the genes.
So little of our brain structure depends on information provided from the DNA
and so much turns on brain/world interaction that our psychological structures,
modularized or not, are simply not “genetically specified.” If we need stimulus
inputs and endogenous innervations not only to create the structures in the first
place, but to maintain them in their current form (and their current form evolves as
innervation patterns change), then it is impossible to maintain that our processing
streams are “genetically specified.” For the role of genes in the process of brain
structure formation is grossly insufficient to explain the (potentially changing)
shape that brain structure takes.
We may, nonetheless, have been faced with recurrent adaptive problems
throughout our evolutionary history, and our brains may have indeed recurrently produced information-processing solutions to these problems. But separate,
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distinct, genetically specified, “brain circuits” were not required to solve these
recurrent adaptive problems. Our brains hit upon a different solution: general
plasticity that allows particular environmental demands to participate heavily
in tailoring the responses to those very demands. This process can produce
relatively stable brain structures that specialize primarily in particular informationprocessing tasks, and these relatively stable structures can be produced with some
regularity across populations and down lineages. However, the degree to which
the outcomes of human brain development have been regular throughout some
of our evolutionary history is due to the fact that generally plastic human brains
have encountered recurrent environmental demands throughout that history. It is
not due to the presence of a “genetic program” that “specifies” recurrent developmental outcomes. Armchair reasoning leads evolutionary psychologists astray: Our
ancestors may have encountered diverse problems, but the brain evolved a general
solution to those problems.
Such a general solution, by the way, is not unique to the brain. The immune
system constantly faces threat from a structurally diverse array of antigens. Like
evolutionary psychologists, we could reason a priori that the immune system must
have evolved separate “immuno-modules,” each of which is specialized to solve the
adaptive problem posed by a particular antigen. But the immune system has, in fact,
hit upon a general solution to the multitude of specific problems posed by antigens.
Through a single, elegant process B cells assemble antibodies in response to each
invading antigen, without the benefit of a “gene for” each different antibody (Clark,
1995). If we were to look at the antibody population in any given adult human, we
would find a dazzling variety of antibodies, each specialized at attacking a specific
antigen. But this “structure” within the antibody population of a mature adult has
very little to do with genes, having instead been shaped by interaction between
the B-cell antibody-assembly process and the antigenic environment to which that
individual has been exposed. The “structure” is not a product of gene expression,
but of immune system/environment interaction.3
4. What Is Old Is New Again?
In concluding, we would like to address a few objections that may have accumulated in response to the foregoing.
Evolutionary psychologists subscribe to the view, common among cognitive
scientists, that cognitive processes can be described at both an informationprocessing level (which specifies the information and procedures, or algorithms,
3 The analogy with the immune system may bring to mind Edelman (1992), who maintains that
the brain and the immune system are both instances of a recognition system and that, consequently,
their dynamics are in accordance with the same set of principles. We are neutral with respect to these
metaphysical views. Our point is simply that, since the immune system evolved a single, general
solution to a plethora of diverse adaptive problems, there can be no a priori reason why the brain
could not have evolved a single, general solution to the plethora of diverse adaptive problems it
faced.
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involved in performing certain tasks) and a physical level (which specifies “the
interaction of neurons, hormones, neurotransmitters, and other organic aspects”
in which the information processing is instantiated) (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992,
p. 64; see also Cosmides and Tooby, 1987). In short, they maintain a distinction
between describing the “software,” or programs, that constitute cognition and
describing the “hardware” in which those programs are implemented. Further,
according to evolutionary psychologists, an accurate description of informationprocessing procedures can be provided “without reference to the exact neurophysiological processes that perform these tasks” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992,
p. 64). Indeed, they claim, “knowledge of this hardware . . . is not necessary for
understanding the programs [that constitute cognition] as information-processing
systems” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p. 65).
The evolutionary psychological concept of a module is clearly a “software”
concept, which individuates modules in terms of the information they deal with
and the procedures they employ in dealing with it. So, for example, evolutionary
psychologists might not be impressed that our speech areas receive inputs from
both auditory and visual areas and that how much input we receive from each
modality depends on how we are getting linguistic information. (Are we seeing
it or are we hearing it?) They wouldn’t be impressed because they could say that
our language module is information specific. It processes linguistic information,
regardless of modality. They could respond that, since all of our arguments are cast
at the “hardware” level (concerning the neurological details of brain development
and organization), our arguments are not relevant to whether the brain exhibits the
evolved information-processing modularity they hypothesize. They could, that is,
argue that all the points we’ve made concern mere implementation details, and that
their modularity hypothesis is neutral with respect to such details. What matters,
they could claim, is not how the brain succeeds in developing and organizing
itself into modules, but only that it succeeds in doing so, even if the method it
employs in doing so is proliferate-and-prune. As long as domain-specific mechanisms, which function to solve adaptive problems, somehow emerge during the
course of development, then, even if they overlap one another at the implementation
level (so that the same neurons or neural groups process inputs for more than one
module), such domain-specific mechanisms could still be psychological adaptations, having been tailored by natural selection to solve their respective problems.
For “it is primarily the information-processing structure of the human psychological architecture that has been functionally organized by natural selection, and the
neurophysiology has been organized insofar as it physically realized this cognitive
organization” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p. 66). Thus, evolutionary psychologists might conclude, by focusing strictly on the “physical level,” our arguments
fail to disprove their modularity hypothesis.
There are (at least) two problems with this response. First, it is simply false
that knowledge of our “hardware” is not necessary for understanding our cognitive
“programs,” as long as understanding our cognitive programs means getting it right

EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, MEET DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROBIOLOGY

319

about the information processing that takes place in the mind. Standard methods
in cognitive science for (dis)confirming computational models are measures of
reaction times of human subjects and relative complexity profiles of computational models, e.g., number of computational steps (see Pylyshyn, 1984). But
reaction times are measures of physical processes, while relative complexity
profiles concern the abstract formal properties of a model. To compare the relative
complexity profiles of competing computational models with human reaction
times, in order to determine which model (more) accurately portrays human information processing, assumptions must be made about precisely how the competing
computational processes might be realized in human brains. In short, computational models must be hypotheses about the information processing occurring
in identified processes in the brain. If they are strictly abstract models, which
attempt to remain neutral about implementation, no possible empirical evidence
can (dis)confirm them (see Buller, 1993 for the full argument; see also Hardcastle
1995 and Schweizer, forthcoming). Thus, an understanding of cognitive processing
precisely is an understanding of the neurophysiological processes in the brain.
Second, the response presupposes that selection can build adaptations at an
abstractly functional level, without bothering with the details about how to build the
structures that implement the functions. But this gets things precisely backwards.
By definition, adaptations are traits that have a history of preservation and modification under selection in the direction of greater functional effectiveness. And
selection occurs only when three conditions are met: (1) there must be variation
in traits; (2) this variation must produce fitness differences; and (3) the variation
must be heritable (Endler, 1986; Ridley, 1996; Futuyma, 1998). Heritability, in
turn, requires that differences in the traits responsible for differential fitness be due
to genetic differences. Thus, if a trait is an adaptation, we know three things about
it. (1) At some point in the evolutionary history of the lineage with that trait, there
was variation with respect to the possession of the trait; some individuals had it and
some didn’t. (2) The individuals with that trait had higher fitness, on average, than
individuals without. And, most importantly, (3) the difference between having and
not having the trait was due to a genetic difference between individuals with and
without the trait (see also Brandon, 1990, pp. 165–174). This is why evolutionary
biologists standardly say: “Adaptive evolution is caused by natural selection acting
on genetic variation” (Futuyma, 1998, p. 227). In short, adaptations must have a
“genetic basis.”
Genes, however, do nothing but code for the proteins that make up an organism’s
body (Godfrey-Smith, 1999, 2000). So the genetic basis of an adaptation can
affect its development only by affecting its structure. That is, while adaptations
are (typically) selected because of the functions they perform, the genetic basis
of an adaptation can only developmentally produce that function by producing a
structure that performs it. Thus, the genes for cognitive adaptations can affect information processing (“software”) only by affecting brain processes (“hardware”).
Genes cannot possibly affect information processing without affecting the neural
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substrate in a way that determines its functional properties (cf., Deacon, 1997,
pp. 332–333). Consequently, selection has shaped human cognition only by altering
the neurophysiology of the brain over evolutionary time; so whatever psychological
adaptations humans possess are the indirect result of direct modifications to the socalled “hardware” of the brain. Or, if you like yours with metaphysical jargon, as
Fodor says: “Since psychological structure (presumably) supervenes on neurological structure, genotypic variation affects the architecture of the mind only via
its effect on the organization of the brain” (2000, p. 88). In contrast to the above
passage from Tooby and Cosmides, then, it is primarily the neurophysiology of the
brain that has been organized by natural selection.
Perhaps it’s worth clarifying a couple of points here. First, this bit of standard
evolutionary biology has nothing to do with the so-called “units of selection
problem.” That problem concerns which entities in a hierarchy running from genes
to organisms to groups benefit from adaptations (see Sober, 2000, p. 90). Saying
that adaptations must have a “genetic basis” is wholly neutral with respect to
this issue, since it’s wholly compatible with organisms’ being the recipients of
the benefits of an adaptation. Second, it also has nothing to do with what there
is “selection for.” In particular, it does not entail that there is only selection for
genes. Obviously there is selection for adaptive phenotypes; this follows straightforwardly from the definition of “selection for” (see Sober, 1984, pp. 97–102). To
say that adaptations must have a “genetic basis” is merely to say that the difference
between having (had) and not having (had) an adaptive trait must be due to a genetic
difference between individuals with and without the trait. Differences between
individuals that are due strictly to environmental differences cannot form the basis
of adaptive evolution; so traits that are environmentally induced are not adaptations
(see Brandon, 1990, pp. 165–174). Indeed, the standard definition of “evolution”
in evolutionary biology is that evolution is change in gene or genotype frequencies
across generations in a population (Ridley, 1996; Futuyma, 1998; Sober, 2000). So
phenotypic changes across generations that are due to environmental changes (e.g.,
the increase in average height in the western world during the 20th century, which
was due to improved nutrition) are not even biological evolution, let alone adaptive
evolution. Only phenotypic changes that are driven by underlying genetic changes
can constitute adaptive evolution.
The fact that psychological adaptations are the result of genetic modifications
to the brain means that so-called “implementation details” are absolutely central
to issues about cognitive adaptation. Furthermore, the neural details can often
refute what psychologists take to be clearly and distinctly true. Let us return to
the example of the information-specific language module, which had been taken as
more-or-less gospel in psychology for decades. Once neurophysiologists began to
look at how our auditory system actually works, they came to learn that our brain
processes speech and non-speech acoustic information in essentially the same way
along the same processing tracts running from the inferior colliculus to the medial
geniculate nucleus to primary and secondary auditory cortex. Our brains simply
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don’t segregate speech from non-speech information.4 And there are two morals to
be drawn from these facts.
First, even if brain development results in modularization, the process by
which this occurs does matter with respect to determining whether those modules
are adaptations, as evolutionary psychologists claim. As mentioned earlier,
evolutionary psychologists claim that modules have evolved under selection
independently of each other – that there has been independent selective shaping of,
for example, the alleged module for cheater detection and the alleged module for
mate preference. For each module, this requires the presence of numerous genes
that have been preserved by selection because of their role in the developmental
construction of that module. For all the reasons we have offered, however, the facts
don’t support the idea of there being such “genes for” all our many relatively
special-purpose brain structures. Those structures, instead, are environmentally
induced by the processes we have described. They are not “specified” by gene
complexes that were selected during human evolutionary history. (This too would
explain why our auditory-processing tracts are virtually identical to those found in
non-human species who have no linguistic capacities.)
Second, it is a mistake to seek adaptations among the products of brain
development – that is, among the relatively special-purpose brain structures that
emerge during the course of brain development. Those products are highly plastic
responses to environmental inputs. Our cognitive adaptation is, instead, the process
that continually generates and modifies special-purpose brain structures. That is,
with the possible exception of our sensory transducers, it is not the contingently
stable brain structures in an adult’s brain that are adaptations; rather, the brain’s
very developmental plasticity is the adaptation (Deacon, 1997), and the relatively
stable structures are byproducts of that adaptation’s functioning in a particular
environment. Similarly, it is not each and every antibody in an adult’s system that
is an evolutionary adaptation (although they are adaptive in the adult’s current
environment); rather, the evolutionary adaptation is the process by which the
immune system is capable of generating a virtually endless array of antibodies
in response to a virtually endless (and evolutionarily novel) array of antigens.
At this point, evolutionary psychologists may object that we have simply
come full circle and returned to good-old-fashioned domain-general psychology,
which they claim to have soundly refuted. But we haven’t exactly, although
that may be hard to tell. The reason it may be hard to tell is that evolutionary psychologists conflate two different domain-general conceptions of the
mind/brain. That conflation is evident in typical characterizations of the good-oldfashioned view. That view, according to Tooby and Cosmides, maintains that “any
evolved component, processing, or mechanism must be equipotential, contentfree, content-independent, general-purpose, domain-general, and so on . . . . In
short, these mechanisms must be constructed in such a way that they can absorb
any kind of cultural message or environmental input equally well” (1992, p.
4 We thank an anonymous referee for this example.
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29). In addition, according to the old view, they say, “natural selection removed
‘genetically determined’ systems of behavior [in humans] and replaced them with
general-purpose learning mechanisms or content-independent cognitive processes”
(1992, p. 34). But, “equipotential, content-free, content-independent, generalpurpose, domain-general” mechanisms are one thing; “equipotential, content-free,
content-independent, general-purpose, domain-general” cognitive processes are
quite another. We believe that evolutionary psychologists (though not only evolutionary psychologists) have been right to argue that a mind equipped solely with
content-independent, domain-general cognitive learning rules (such as trial-anderror induction) “cannot unassisted perform at least most and perhaps all of the
tasks humans routinely perform and need to perform” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992,
p. 39). It is no doubt true that content-independent, domain-general rules could
never acquire all the information and domain-specific problem-solving procedures
that are necessary for speaking a language, say, or detecting cheaters in social
exchanges. From this, however, it doesn’t follow that no content-independent,
domain-general mechanism is capable of producing a structure that is specialized
at solving problems in such narrow domains. Indeed, we have shown that the
very complex adaptive mechanism by which our brains structure themselves is
equipotential, content free, content independent, general purpose, and domain
general. That general-purpose adaptive mechanism, however, gives rise to domaindominant processing regions, which in turn give us rich, content-filled, and highly
specialized cognitive processes. Our point is that you don’t need (and in fact don’t
have) “genetically specified” cognitive modules, which evolved under selection,
in order to get cognitive processes tailored to meet highly specific environmental task demands. Though our cognitive processes are highly specific indeed,
our brains learned how to produce them – not in the sense of acquiring them
from antecedently possessed, domain-general cognitive rules, but in the sense of
allowing environmental demands to shape a structure that executes those cognitive
processes.
We can think of our mind/brains as similar to impressionistic paintings. When
we look at them from a distance, we can discern definite shapes, texture, and colors,
united into distinct objects existing against a specific background. From a distance,
impressionistic paintings look modular, with each object possessing its own unique
characteristics. Up close, however, we can see that the oh-so-definite objects are
nothing but carefully placed blobs of paint, blobs not distinguishable in terms of
any unique characteristics. A background blob is just like an object blob.
Evolutionary psychologists expect our mind/brains to be a paint-by-thenumbers, with all the objects and the scene set by the machinery that cranks
out such toys well before any painters arrive to follow the directions. They are
wrong; our mind unfolds in an elegant dance, fueled by its environment and its
internal dynamics, determined by nothing more than its immediate and more distal
surroundings.
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